A Matter of Definitions: The Profiling of People in Italian Active Labour Market Policies by Mozzana, Carlotta
www.ssoar.info
A Matter of Definitions: The Profiling of People in
Italian Active Labour Market Policies
Mozzana, Carlotta
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Mozzana, C. (2019). A Matter of Definitions: The Profiling of People in Italian Active Labour Market Policies. Historical
Social Research, 44(2), 225-246. https://doi.org/10.12759/hsr.44.2019.2.225-246
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur




This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Historical Social Research 44 (2019) 2, 225-246 │ published by GESIS 
DOI: 10.12759/hsr.44.2019.2.225-246 
A Matter of Definitions: The Profiling of People  
in Italian Active Labour Market Policies 
Carlotta Mozzana ∗ 
Abstract: »Eine Definitionsfrage: Die Profilierung von Personen in der aktiven Ar-
beitsmarktpolitik Italiens«. The article explores the implications for public wel-
fare policy of the current reliance on quantification tools to assess both people 
and programs. In this context, profiling has recently acquired a key role in ac-
tive labour market policies, because it allows policy administrators to distin-
guish among different levels of risk in individuals approaching the labour mar-
ket. After discussing the issue of the deployment of numbers in policies, I 
present and contextualize a recent case study: a national profiling system 
adopted in Italy in fulfilment of Youth Guarantee, a European public policy 
whose aim is to support young people entering the labour market via dedicated 
services. In the second part of the article, I outline how the profiling system 
was devised and how it works, going on to report a qualitative study on the 
implications of using the Disadvantage Index - the core of the profiling model 
– and how it was modified after an initial test phase. The research findings 
suggest that, in contradiction with the Index’ original goals, it has ended up 
screening out the more disadvantaged NEETs, with the risk of perpetuating 
their disadvantage. In the conclusions section, I return to the role of numbers 
and indicators in governing public policy, as well as their contribution to the 
depoliticization of public action. 
Keywords: Profiling system, sociology of quantification, active labour market 
policies, Youth Guarantee, public action, depoliticization, Italy. 
1.   Introduction 
In recent decades, the appeal to indices, indicators, and numbers has, in gen-
eral, been strongly on the rise everywhere, and quantification is now a perva-
sive feature of contemporary society (Bartl, Papilloud, and Terracher-Lipinski 
2019, in this issue). Within this broader trend, quantification tools are widely 
applied in public welfare policy to assess both people and programs. Several 
factors have contributed to this phenomenon: first, the spread of an audit cul-
ture and New Public Management (NPM) logics (Power 1997; Clarke and 
Newman 1997) to welfare services, resulting in a profound reconfiguration of 
                                                             
∗  Carlotta Mozzana, Department of Sociology and Social Research, University of Milano-
Bicocca, via Bicocca degli Arcimboldi 8, 20126 Milano, Italy; carlotta.mozzana@unimib.it. 
HSR 44 (2019) 2  │  226 
social rights as needs and means of satisfying them via a process of moraliza-
tion of the recipients’ deservingness (Doyal and Gough 1991). Second, the 
consequent reduction in public spending on welfare has been exacerbated in 
recent years as the socio-economic crisis has pushed decision-makers to intro-
duce a system of constraints. This was accompanied by the paradigm of univer-
sal rights shifting to that of conditional rights, and ultimately to that of bal-
anced budget extremism (Sen 1997), with balancing public expenditure taking 
precedence over the provision of social rights. Third, and more generally, a 
growing demand for accessible and comparable knowledge in the form of 
quantitative evidence, which “is seen as essential for developing reasonable 
policy at local, national and international level” (Rottenburg and Merry 2015, 
1). Numbers have thus become relevant to all phases of policy making, largely 
because they are viewed as a transparent, synthetic, objective, and neutral in-
strument for assessing policies and people (see also Bode 2019, in this issue). 
While quantification (and subsequently its role in contemporary society) has 
become a key field of inquiry within sociology (Porter 1995; Espeland and 
Stevens 2008; Lampland and Star 2009; Desrosières 2011; Rottenburg et al. 
2015; Espeland and Sauder 2016) and the use of quantification tools to inform 
public action and policies has been widely acknowledged since the advent of 
NPM to public administration and services1 (Busso 2015; Bifulco 2016), the 
implications of adopting these instruments to manage access to public services 
has received far less attention. In Italy, while forms of quantification are widely 
used to assess the social, economic, or political impact of public policy, Youth 
Guarantee (YG) is the first national programme that has used a profiling system 
to control access to a public service. Launched in 2013 in response to an EU 
directive to help young people who are not in education, in employment, or in 
training (NEET) enter the labour market, YG is a programme that aims to fill 
gaps in young people’s educational and professional experience: EU Member 
States were therefore invited to identify a strategy for offering youth under 25 
years  
a high-quality offer of work, further education, apprenticeship or traineeship, 
or other training interventions within four months of unemployment starting 
or leaving the formal education system. (Italian Youth Guarantee Implementa-
tion Plan, 2013)  
Access to YG is regulated by a profiling system applied by social workers in 
local employment services to evaluate the level of disadvantage presented by 
potential participants in the scheme. The profiling is linked to a system of fixed 
refunds compensating the participating agencies for the mix of the services 
provided to the young people enrolled in the programme. As shall be claimed 
                                                             
1  Although quantification in the realm of public administration and services already existed 
prior to the rise of NPM, there was previously less (or no, as in the case of Italy) emphasis on 
the evaluation of outputs (Bifulco 2016). 
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later, profiling people is not a neutral action. Originally a law enforcement 
strategy deploying scientific methods to monitor individuals with a view to 
preventing crime (Molteni 2011), profiling is now used in public welfare as a 
tool for defining personalized programmes allocating jobseekers to different 
intervention streams (OECD 2014a). But this shift, as we shall see, has conse-
quences for people and policies.  
The article begins with an overview of concepts and approaches that allow 
us to investigate the role of numbers in the profiling tools used to determine 
eligibility for support services under active labour market policies. I then pre-
sent a case study, the above-mentioned profiling system used in Italy to regu-
late access to YG, in an effort to analyse how the system was devised and how 
it works. I enter into some detail about differences in how it has been imple-
mented locally and how altered expectations about its functioning have resulted 
in the exclusion of the more disadvantaged youth from the programme. Finally, 
I return to the role of numbers in governing public policy, as well as their con-
tribution to the depoliticization of public action. 
2.  Numbers and Policies: A Toolbox for Critical Analysis  
In recent decades, there has been a substantial increase in practices and laws 
based on standards and numbers, whose aim is to assess and orient human 
action (Desrosieres 1993; Porter 1995; Power 1997; Espeland and Stevens 
2008). Investigating the ways in which numbers are produced, communicated, 
and practiced, the consequences in terms of how modern life is organized and 
shaped, and the social implications of the phenomenon (Espeland and Stevens 
2008, 402) sheds lights on the ways in which we organize, define, and give 
meaning to the world, because numbers, in short, “do things”. They are used to 
transform differences into quantities, via a process that requires huge social and 
intellectual investment to define a standardized and recognizable form for 
representing a specific difference (Thévenot 2009). At the same time, numbers 
can have multiple purposes and meanings, which are established through use 
(Espeland and Steven 2008, 405) and may differ from those originally intend-
ed.  
Furthermore, numbers act on the world they contribute to describing. On the 
one hand, they modify power relations by influencing the distribution of re-
sources, knowledge, and opportunities (Espeland and Steven 2008), taking on a 
regulatory function previously conferred on the law (Supiot 2015). On the other 
hand, numbers can induce reactivity, causing people to think and act in a dif-
ferent way (Espeland and Sauder 2007) and “making up people” (Hacking 
1986) by creating or reinforcing the categories used to think about human be-
ings. Furthermore, they are easily circulated and lend themselves both to ex-
cluding and to integrating information, making it easier to understand reality. 
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However, measures may also have the capacity to discipline and to make reali-
ty more governable by defining what is to be considered appropriate or normal, 
translating statistical normality into a moral aspiration2 (Espeland and Stevens 
2008). Thusly, numbers bear the performative potential to fabricate reality: 
thanks to the parsimony with which they describe phenomena, numbers pro-
vide a precise account while establishing what is to be viewed as relevant 
knowledge with regard to a specific phenomenon; and thanks to the standardi-
zation they imply, quantitative data save on plural interpretations and represen-
tations as well as voices and conflicts, ruling out differences and plurality. 
When numbers make their appearance in public policies, they become tools3 
of public action. And as part of the instrumentation of government, “they are 
bearers of values, fuelled by one interpretation of the social and by precise 
notions of the mode of regulation envisaged” (Lascoumes and Le Galés 2007, 
4).  
Via the representations and meanings they encourage, the ways in which 
they are constructed, and the choices underpinning them, they effectively or-
ganize relations between the State and those at whom they are directed 
(Lascoumes and Le Galés 2007, 4), producing effects and playing a role in the 
process of political change. Furthermore, the numbers used in public policies 
have informational bases of judgement embedded in them: a concept developed 
by Amartya Sen (1992, 1990) within his capability approach framework, an 
informational basis of judgement may be defined as “the information on which 
the judgment is directly dependent [that] determines the factual territory to 
which justice considerations are directly applied” (Sen 1990). It thus comprises 
those items of information and knowledge that are viewed as salient to the 
policy-making process and which have to do with the value judgements inher-
ent to the policy, service, or program. Identifying the informational bases of 
judgement is key to marking out the “factual territory” of political choices 
about justice, that is to say, the types of information in which political deci-
sions are grounded. It makes explicit the link between the cognitive and norma-
tive dimensions of public policies, pointing up what knowledge is viewed as 
salient to (political) choices about how to design and implement public policies 
(de Leonardis 2009). In this respect, it is important to establish whether they 
resemble, to borrow a metaphor from Bruno Latour, a black box that hides the 
                                                             
2  Normality is primarily understood here in the statistical sense, that is to say, as the tendency 
for incidences of a phenomenon to be arranged around their average value in a bell curve. 
However, as Espeland and Stevens have claimed following Foucault, “it is easy to conflate 
normal in a statistical sense with normal in a moral sense […] and measures easily become 
(moral) aspirations” (Espeland and Stevens 2008, 416). 
3  As Lascoumes and Le Galés have argued, the difference between a tool and an instrument is 
that the former is a micro device within a technique (such as a statistical category within a 
statistical nomenclature), while the latter is a social institution (such as a policy) (Lascoumes 
and Le Galés 2007). 
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process of compromise, choice, and negotiation that led to their definition 
(Latour 1987) or whether, on the contrary, such processes remain visible and 
accessible to public discussion and modification (de Leonardis 2009). Although 
informational bases are often implicit and not immediately recognizable, they 
offer a key to understanding policies in action, beyond the discursive rhetoric 
that accompanied their design (Monteleone and Mozzana 2009).  
3.  Methodology 
The data reported are drawn from a broader research project entitled “Quantifi-
cation in public policies: forms of knowledge and public decision-making in 
active labour market policies in Italy” (Mozzana 2015). The main aim of the 
research was to examine the role and use of quantifying instrumentation in 
public policies in Italy and its effects in terms of depoliticization and transfor-
mation of social citizenship. The project’s leading case study was Youth Guar-
antee, an EU programme launched on 22 April 2013 by the European Council 
to address youth unemployment and the high rate of NEETs all over Europe: 
the European Council made dedicated funds available to help young people 
enter the labour market and each Member State was required to provide youth 
with support and services in continued education or vocational training, ap-
prenticeships, or traineeships, employment and financial support for self-
employment4. 
The research was divided into two phases, both using qualitative research 
methods (e.g., interviews, participant observation, documentary analysis). The 
aim of the first phase was to analyse the policy at the national level with a 
special focus on the profiling system, using documentary analysis and inter-
views with opinion leaders and policy makers, while the second phase was 
focused on the local implementation of the policy in the context of three re-
gional case studies (Lombardy, Campania, and Emilia Romagna) using mainly 
participant observation and in-depth interviews with project managers, social 
workers, case managers, and beneficiaries of the YG services. The present 
article is based on the data from the first phase of the research project and only 
partially on data from the second phase, comprising the analysis of twelve in-
depth interviews with national and local (Lombardy and Campania) project 
managers and opinion leaders, legal documents, and support materials pro-
duced nationally and locally for the Italian Youth Guarantee programme. 
                                                             
4  See the next section for a broader explanation of the programme. 
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4.  The Setting up of a National Profiling System in Italy 
The past decade has seen a substantial increase in the unemployment rate, 
especially among young people and in certain regions of the European Union. 
This phenomenon has gone hand in hand with the emergence of a new category 
of young person, the so-called NEETs, or youths who are no longer in the 
education system and are not working or being trained for work. In 2016, the 
average percentage of NEETs in the European Union was 15.6%, but with 
significant variation across countries, ranging from 7.2% and 7.9% respectively 
in Sweden and the Netherlands to 25.6% in Greece and 26% in Italy (Eurostat 
2017).  
Although the situation is more critical in some countries than in others, the 
European Union views the NEETs as a major concern. Thus, on 22 April 2013, 
the European Council issued a “youth guarantee” to address the issue by mak-
ing dedicated funds available to help young people enter the labour market. 
Each Member State committed to drawing up its own National Implementation 
Plan following the Open Method of Coordination. Though the devised schemes 
and implementation systems were allowed to differ from one country to anoth-
er, they were all required to provide youth with support and services in the 
following areas: a) continued education or vocational training; b) apprentice-
ships or traineeships; c) a good quality offer of employment; and d) financial 
support for self-employment.  
The Italian Implementation Plan became operative on 1 May 2014, with a 
budget of €1.513 billion: €567 million from the Youth Employment Initiative, 
€567 million from the European Social Fund and €379 million in national co-
funding. Different services are envisaged under the plan: after an information 
phase that is open to all, the young person may be redirected towards education 
programmes or towards profiling and initial orientation services. Once this 
phase has been completed, there may be a second-level orientation phase or the 
beneficiary may be immediately directed towards one of the available training 
or employment options (e.g., vocational training, traineeships, apprenticeships, 
job offers, forms of support for self-entrepreneurship, regional civil service).  
One of the major innovations introduced with the Italian YG is the adoption 
of a national statistical profiling system. The use of profiling systems in em-
ployment services is recent but not brand-new: introduced in the 1990s in the 
United States, profiling has since become widely used in this field (Koning 
2007; OECD 2014a) to analyse and segment the demand-side of employment 
(OECD 2014b). Profiling systems are usually based on quantitative data used 
to classify people into a limited number of categories in order to develop more 
tailored projects and provide additional support for those who need it most 
(OECD 2014a). 
In the case of Youth Guarantee, the Italian Ministry of Labour and Social 
Policy commissioned a group of economists and statisticians from Isfol (a 
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public research institute) with the task of developing a profiling system, includ-
ing an index to be used specifically for profiling purposes (the so-called ‘Dis-
advantage Index’ (DI)). The system comprises two tools: the DI and the Per-
sonal and Professional Data Sheet (SAP). It “assigns to each young person 
taking part in the Plan [...] a ‘Disadvantage Index’ score that is a measure of 
his/her labour market challenges” (Isfol 2014, 1)5, thus regulating access to the 
YG services and schemes. More specifically, the DI indicates, for each young 
person enrolled on the programme, the level of disadvantage that he or she 
faces in accessing the labour market based on a set of parameters defining the 
characteristics and circumstances of the young person and determining his/her 
eligibility to proceed to the orientation interview. Depending on the DI value 
obtained, the young person is assigned to one of the four “Disadvantage Clas-
ses” (DC) that the plan envisages: each of the classes is in turn associated with 
a fixed reimbursement system and a policy for encouraging companies to hire 
young people, known as the employment bonus. Both reimbursements and 
bonus vary in size as a function of DC: the more a young person is disadvan-
taged, the greater the amount of support given. The employment bonus, to 
provide an example of the policy’s underlying logic, varies as reported in the 
following table: 
Table 1: Amount of Employment Bonus by Disadvantage Class and Type of 
Contract (Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 2015) 
 
Disadvantage Class of the NEET 
Low Medium-low Medium-high High 
Fixed-term contract lasting 6-12 
months  - - € 1.500 € 2.000 
Fixed-term contract lasting over 
12 months - - € 3.000 € 4.000 
Permanent employment contract € 1.500 € 3.000 € 4.500 € 6.000 
5. Access by Numbers: Informational Basis and Policy 
Decision Making 
Given that the SAP is based on the information summarized in the DI (Mozza-
na 2015), I focus here on the latter. The DI, as stated, regulates access to the 
Italian YG while estimating the relative difficulty that a specific young person 
will encounter in accessing the labour market (Isfol 2014, 1). But how is the DI 
structured? And what role does it play in this phase of the scheme?  
                                                             
5  All citations drawn from Italian documents/interviews have been translated into English by 
the author to facilitate comprehension for the readers. 
HSR 44 (2019) 2  │  232 
Let us start from the beginning. Statistically speaking, the DI indicates the 
level of disadvantage that a young individual faces in approaching the labour 
market in light of both individual and territorial factors. The variables included 
in the model and their estimated weights were defined using a statistical criteri-
on: they are the factors that explained variance in a logistic regression model 
on the expected probability, between 0 and 1, that a given young person would 
have NEET status as opposed to being in employment. The regression was 
conducted for a representative sample of the population eligible for YG, based 
on data from the ISTAT (the Italian National Statistics Institute) Labour Force 
Survey. As stated in the documents outlining the profiling system,  
a principle of parsimony should be brought to bear on identifying the charac-
teristics accounting for NEET status, which means using the model with the 
least amount of information to explain the phenomenon. (Isfol 2014, 2)  
Thus, the index comprises eight variables of two different types: five individual 
variables (age, gender, years spent living in Italy, level of education, and em-
ployment status a year prior to enrolling on the YG scheme) and three territori-
al variables (variation in the unemployment rate of 15-29 year olds at the pro-
vincial level, risk of family poverty, and entrepreneurial density at the regional 
level)6.  
Once the DI has been calculated, the NEET is assigned to one of the four 
DCs envisaged in the plan (high, medium-high, medium-low, low disad-
vantage), each of which is associated with different services and levels of sup-
port according to the severity of the disadvantage due to the presence of a fixed 
refund system. In other words, the DI defines the amount of support that may 
be drawn down for that specific young person, establishing clear financing 
limits to what may be done for that person, what is appropriate and normal or 
inappropriate and inapplicable (regardless of the individual’s actual circum-
stances, desires, or abilities) and to what is actually done by the local agencies. 
In a word, in setting the economic limits of the available support, the standard 
refund system connected with the DI functioned to define “normality” by sup-
porting precise types of NEET, then regulating and defining ex ante the con-
straints on their pathways through the programme. 
In addition, the index is calculated based on a small number of relatively 
general variables. While parsimony is a valid statistical principle that should be 
respected when explaining or predicting a phenomenon, the situation is differ-
ent when the function of an index is not to describe reality, but to regulate it, 
effectively serving to unlock (or block) access to employment support schemes. 
Viewed from this perspective, the DI relies on a very poor informational basis, 
both quantitatively (only eight variables are included in the model) and qualita-
                                                             
6  The Disadvantage Index is as calculated using the formula: p = ௘೤ଵା௘೤, where y is the statistical 
combination of the individual and territorial variables and their estimated weights. 
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tively (the variables are very general and cannot fully capture and represent the 
situation of the participants in the scheme) because the NEET population in-
cludes young persons with fast-changing lives in vastly different circumstances 
and systems of opportunity (Furlong 2006; Yates and Payne 2006). In this case, 
statistical parsimony seems to be more hindrance than a help in directing recip-
ients to adequate services: even in the social workers’ words, “the DI does not 
help me to understand the young individual I meet… It just sets out what I can 
do with her” (Interview 12). 
Furthermore, the profiling system does not include7, beyond the statistical 
tool, other forms of knowledge and relative information that are known to be 
helpful in identifying the barriers a young person might face in approaching the 
labour market and directing him or her towards an appropriate set of services 
and support, as caseworkers are trained to do8 (ILO 2017). Defining individual 
interventions on such a meagre informational basis risks generating projects 
that do not meaningfully impact on the situation of the young NEETs because 
too little is known about their actual circumstances, desires, and aspirations. In 
place of personalized paths, the use of this kind of profiling tool prompts stand-
ardised responses to young people, going in the opposite direction to what is 
stated in the plan, which aims to provide “tailor-made paths that will be locally 
designed for each individual youth, while taking into account the characteris-
tics of the target population” (Italian Implementation Plan of the YG, 14), and 
which describes the index as a “suitable instrument for ensuring the construc-
tion of an individual path consistent with the personal, educational and profes-
sional characteristics of the user” (Implementation Decree 23 January 2015, 
Art. 1).  
The provision of tailor-made services is one of the main features of active 
labour market and social policies (van Berkel and Hornemann Møller 2002). 
While more inclusive and sustainable policies view collecting information on 
the beneficiary (and especially from him/her) as essential to designing tailor-
made intervention (de Leonardis 2012), those that adopt a workfare approach to 
activation have struggled to generate employment for the most vulnerable 
unemployed (Ellison and van Berkel, 2014) (and young NEETs are vulnerable 
unemployed9) while producing growth in insecure, unpaid, and poor-quality 
                                                             
7  In 2018, the profiling system was changed slightly and is now complemented by a qualita-
tive assessment conducted by the social workers during their initial interviews with the 
young people. Nonetheless, the considerations outlined above about the mode and duration 
of contact between beneficiaries and Public Employment Services staff remain valid (in the 
majority of cases, only one, extremely brief, interview is held). 
8  Caseworker-based client segmentation is a method used in Austria, France, and Slovakia, in 
which experienced caseworkers combine qualitative tools (e.g., interviews, tests, own 
judgement) to profile the recipients of a public intervention (ILO 2017). 
9  In fact, young NEETs are not a homogeneous group but, due to their condition, they risk 
labour market disadvantage and social exclusion, and some subgroups are even more prone 
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jobs (Dean et al., 2005; McQuaid and Lindsay 2005; Salognon 2007)10. Since 
its launch, the Italian version of YG has seemed more in line with this second 
version of activation: during the YG profiling phase, the beneficiaries’ voices 
are lost because they are not viewed as sources of key information to be taken 
into account in defining either their own individual programmes or the strategic 
priorities of the scheme more generally. This happens not only because the 
system collects very little information, but also because profiling is, by its 
nature, a tool designed to serialize rather than personalize: it treats youths as 
belonging to one of a number of set types, in which personal characteristics and 
peculiarities diminish in importance, rather than approaching them as unique 
individuals with specific characteristics that differentiate them from one to 
another. Thus, the adoption of a profiling system such as the one analysed 
seems to move in the opposite direction to the delivery of tailor-made services 
and support for young people. 
Indeed, given its explicitly declared function of regulating access to the YG 
scheme in Italy, the risk that profiling will generate standardised, inadequate, 
and poorly personalized responses to the needs of young people is not only 
caused by its inadequate informational basis. The choice to use a number as the 
beneficiary’s ‘identity card’ for accessing employment services itself moves in 
this direction. First, because it limits the spaces available for listening to young 
people's concerns, desires, and abilities, undermining their capability for voice 
(de Leonardis 2012) and consequently their capacity to aspire, that is to say, the 
ability to imagine different future conditions for themselves while managing 
and addressing present situations (Appadurai 2004). By virtue of the supposed 
information value of numbers (Porter 1995), the risk is that employment agen-
cy staff will view the DI as a sufficient basis for defining programmes to sup-
port candidates’ entry to the labour market, as reflected in the words of one 
social worker:  
During the interview I just confirm with the guy/girl whether the information 
[needed for profiling] is correct, what I can do with the Disadvantage Class 
s/he is in [in terms of the available resources] and what available opportunities 
I can offer, at that precise point in time, with that Index. (Interview 11) 
Furthermore, it is the case in some Italian regions that the initial interview with 
the young applicant is not even refunded because it is viewed as a duty of the 
local agencies. This is the case in Lombardy for example, where a candidate’s 
first contact with the YG is a brief and superficial interview with the sole pur-
                                                                                                                                
than others to unemployment, discouragement, and inactivity (see Isengard 2003; Russell 
and O’Connell 2001, and Eurofound 2012 for further background). 
10  Furthermore, the welfare systems that best support inclusive and sustainable growth (as 
defined in the Europe 2020 strategy) are those that foster social protection and equality as 
well as providing employment and vocational training services (Morel, Palier, and Palme 
2012). 
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pose of calculating the DI and assigning a DC. In most instances, this is the 
only occasion in which the young person will be involved in defining his/her 
Personalized Action Plan, the instrument that specifies the services that will be 
activated for him/her. Yet the interview is treated more as a formal bureaucratic 
requirement than as an opportunity to collect information about the young 
person and his/her situation (Interview 10). This leads to the development of 
highly standardised interventions following a path dependency logic that em-
phasizes using up the available resources and services rather than designing ad 
hoc activation pathways. 
However, even in other regions such as Campania, where the first interview 
is covered by public funding and local public employment services are as-
signed the task of conducting it, the index tends to work to the disadvantage of 
those in the most vulnerable conditions because it masks differences: given the 
small amount of time available to social workers to devise a tailor-made plan, 
the hard cases tend to be underrated because they are condensed into a number 
and not described in all their complexity:  
It has happened to me to have two guys in the same class [the same Disad-
vantage Class], but one needed major support because of his origins and edu-
cational background, while the other one only needed some quick help with 
his CV… but the class was the same, and the Disadvantage Index was very 
similar! (Interview 8)  
By simplifying and integrating information, numbers make individual condi-
tions comprehensible and even comparable, but at the same time they hide 
variety and flatten the situations of young people: the same DC encompasses 
individuals with very different circumstances, abilities and desires, and these 
differences cannot be detected by social workers nor truly personalized inter-
vention designed if the only information available is the DI. 
Furthermore, similar index values can correspond to very different situations 
at both the individual and territorial levels. As pointed out by Monteleone and 
Mozzana (2009), the risk of using standardized instruments that are not com-
plemented by spaces for listening, integrating, and widening the informational 
basis of judgement (which in this case is predefined and shaped by the DI), is 
that the resulting interventions will not be truly personalized and relevant to 
young people. And in the case of vulnerable NEETs, this can leave them even 
worse off than before going on the scheme. With an inadequate personal plan, 
young people cannot live up to their expectations and capacities and, in some 
cases, this can have a negative effect on their motivation, personal beliefs, and 
attitude towards the labour market:  
Given that only a few of them manage to get a permanent position by the end 
of the project, and these are the less disadvantaged ones, the greater part re-
main jobless and with slim chances of getting other work experience because 
the jobs market is so problematic here [Campania Region]… so they feel diso-
riented and believe that they will never get a job. (Interview 11) 
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What is more, the DI and its use are characterised by ambiguity. Not only are 
conflicting goals underpinning its definition, it also appears to fulfil different 
aims: on the one hand, it describes candidates’ situations while, on the other, it 
regulates their access to services. Another purpose becomes clear when we 
consider the application of the profiling system in practice, a purpose that im-
plies a shift in its meaning. In addition to the reasons stated in the official doc-
uments, the ministerial policy-makers also introduced a national profiling sys-
tem to facilitate the uniform evaluation of young people all over the country 
and eliminate the discretionary component implemented by street-level bureau-
crats in traditional social services that usually mediates access to welfare poli-
cies (Interview 1). With this objective in mind, the political priority was to 
devise a quick and easy-to-use tool that could be understood by everyone so as 
to minimize problems during the implementation phase (Interview 2) because, 
amongst other reasons, public and private employment services operate across 
very different regional and local contexts. As emerged from the interviews 
conducted with some of those involved in defining the DI:  
it was important to ensure a certain uniformity throughout the country in the 
assessment of the risk and needs profile of individual users, to remove the dis-
cretion of employment service staff at this stage and therefore prevent inequal-
ities among users (Interview 1)  
and again  
The four-class division was chosen because it was more easily understandable 
and immediate, the other options (ten classes or combined with the use of an-
other statistical tools) would have led to confusion about how they related to 
the index and how to apply them in practice. (Interview 2)  
Hence, yet another objective came into play addressing a traditional and hotly 
debated issue about street-level bureaucratic action: the index was required to 
ensure the absence of personal or group bias (Rottenburg and Merry 2015), that 
is to say, to eliminate the discretional component from decisions about how to 
support young people and because tools based on numbers have this precise 
aim11.  
                                                             
11  Nevertheless, total control over the actions and decision-making of street-level bureaucrats 
in the public service is known to be unattainable: several authors have argued that an “irre-
ducible core of autonomy” remains even after a rigorous standardization process has been 
implemented, as has been the case since the advent of NPM (Kirkpatrick et al. 2005). 
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6. What Can We Expect? By Changing the Index, We 
Change People 
Following the pilot phase, in January 2015 the four DCs were modified. But 
what had happened? Why did they change? 
Again, let us go back to the beginning. Initially, the four classes were de-
fined using the quartiles for the observed distribution of the DI in a representa-
tive sample of the YG-eligible population drawn from the Istat Labour Force 
Survey. Scores were significantly skewed to the right of the distribution, indi-
cating that a large proportion of the young people who were potentially eligible 
for YG were strongly disadvantaged on entering the labour market (Isfol 2014, 
6), as Figure 1 makes clear. 
Figure 1: Distribution of the Level of Disadvantage in the Target Population 
(Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 2015) 
 
Predicting that the actual YG population would share this pattern of distribu-
tion of the DI, the policy-makers opted to define the four DCs to reflect the 
occurrence of disadvantage in the benchmark population, as shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Disadvantage Classes and the Associated Disadvantage Index ranges 
for the Period 1 May 2014 – 31 January 2015 (Ministry of Labour and 
Social Policy 2015) 
Disadvantage Index Thresholds for the Disadvantage Classes expressed as p 
values
Min Max 
1 - Low 0.000000 0.650716
2 - Medium-low 0.650717 0.805638
3 - Medium-high 0.805639 0.897500
4 - High 0.897501 1.000000
 
The rationale for this decision was that it would allow most of the resources to 
be allocated to those who were in the most adverse situations, or rather, to the 
most fragile NEETs. This was confirmed by the Isfol statisticians:  
Initially we proposed dividing the four classes to reflect the distribution 
among the quartiles [...] This was with a view to giving most of the resources 
to the young people who needed them the most, that is to say, those with the 
highest levels of disadvantage and therefore the greatest difficulty in entering 
the labour market. (Interview 2)  
However, following the pilot phase (May 2014 - January 2015), and based on 
the actual applications received in the first six months of implementing YG, it 
was decided to modify the division of the DCs, as shown in Table 3:  
Table 3: Disadvantage Classes and the Associated Disadvantage Index Ranges 
for the Period 31 January 2015 to Date (Ministry of Labour and Social 
Policy 2015). 
Disadvantage Index Thresholds for the Disadvantage Classes expressed as p 
values 
Min  Max  
1 - Low 0.000000 0.250000 
2 - Medium-low 0.250001 0.500000 
3 - Medium-high 0.500001 0.750000 
4 - High 0.750001 1.000000 
 
What happened? The four classes were now made to correspond to four equal 
divisions of the index itself, rather than to its distribution in the population. 
Following the NPM logic of effectiveness and efficiency, this change was 
legitimised by citing concern about the best allocation of resources. In the 
document produced by the statisticians in charge of modifying the classes to 
announce the change and explain the underlying rationale, it was argued that 
change was needed to “obtain a more efficient allocation of resources” because  
the analyses show a certain discrepancy between the eligible population, on 
which the profiling model was estimated, and the subpopulation of persons ac-
tually registered on YG: the mean level of disadvantage among those who ap-
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plied to join the scheme is lower than the mean level of disadvantage in the el-
igible population. (Isfol 2015, 4)  
What does this mean? It means that the young people registered on the scheme 
were less disadvantaged than expected and some of the variables used in the 
DI, such as holding a school-leaving diploma and a high-scoring family profile, 
proved to be correlated with the propensity to join the YG (Isfol 2015, 5). It 
appeared that the most disadvantaged young people, who represented a large 
proportion of the sample analysed to develop the DI, were unable to access the 
YG services (i.e., they were not even able to apply to join the scheme).  
Thus, using a criterion designed to give more support to those who were 
most disadvantaged did not work at all: the most fragile NEETs had not come 
forward, or only did so to a very small extent (and with large differences across 
regions) and a considerable amount of resources, in terms of money and avail-
able services, were not being used because the young people that actually regis-
tered on the scheme needed less support than expected. But the pilot test was 
drawing to a close and the available resources needed to be allocated in order to 
show that the YG scheme was working. Thus, the solution adopted was to 
modify the eligibility for support criteria in order to more effectively allocate 
the money among the less disadvantaged NEETs who had successfully ac-
cessed the scheme. This implied a political choice that was embedded in the 
profiling tool, but not clarified in the documents and public political statements 
about the modification: specifically, to provide the less disadvantaged NEETs 
with more support at the expense of the more disadvantaged ones who were not 
even accessing the scheme, in order to prove the effectiveness of the policy:  
The cruel thing is that the opportunity to repeat the programme in the future 
depends on what we do in the present: the capacity to use the available re-
sources, even if it is for less disadvantaged people, is the proof that the policy 
has effects. […] At that point it was important to start providing reassuring 
numbers about the policy’s relevance. (Interview 1)  
For example, the employment bonus presented at the end of Section 3, which is 
proportionally related to DC (i.e., the greater the level of disadvantage, the 
bigger the bonus), was distributed among a population of young people who 
were less in need, yet who now benefited from forms of support that had previ-
ously been unavailable to them or available to a lesser extent. The redefining of 
the four classes altered the scheme’s target population, because it also rede-
fined who was entitled to be given support programs and increased the levels of 
support to be activated for young people who had previously been classified 
differently. And above all, changing the target population meant in this case 
enforcing a sort of “screening out” procedure for the most disadvantaged: in-
stead of using part of the available resources to develop a special policy for 
reaching out to them and helping them access the YG, they were simply left 
out. This decision was discursively justified by appeal to typical NPM objec-
tives, both in the official documents and in the interviews conducted as part of 
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the study, but the exclusion of the most disadvantaged NEETs was only raised 
as an issue in the latter.  
In other cases, the modification was explained by invoking an efficiency ar-
gument, in relation for example to companies’ reluctance to avail of the em-
ployment bonus under the initial scheme:  
Companies had no interest in hiring the most disadvantaged youths despite the 
employment bonus because it was only for the those NEETs with a very 
strong disadvantage... in short, we were not able to use the available resources. 
(Interview 3)  
However, even after the changes in the DCs, more companies took advantage 
of the incentive and this reinforced the official explanation. Another factor 
drove the new pattern of behaviour on the part of employers: in 2014, a larger 
employment incentive had been offered under the Jobs Act, a law that reformed 
employment legislation in Italy (Law 183/2014)12. Initially, the two incentives 
could not be availed of at the same time, meaning that the YG bonus was left 
unused until the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy decided to change the 
criteria:  
When we changed the criteria concerning the measures and established that 
the two incentives could be cumulatively availed of for young NEETs, the 
companies finally started using the employment bonus together with the Jobs 
Act incentive. (Interview 2) 
The adoption of a quantitative instrument, such as the DI and the correlated 
DCs led, in this case, to the outcome that the political goals and principles 
underlying the policy were subordinated to accounting priorities because these 
two sets of concerns were out of line with one another. This discrepancy was 
enough to justify overlooking the distribution of disadvantage in the population 
as initially intended, and shifting away from the original objective of providing 
stronger support to the most disadvantaged NEETs to that of increasing the 
number of NEETs enrolled on the programme. However, although the numeri-
cal goal was achieved, this obfuscates substantial matters such as the quality of 
the support itself and the recourse to “pushing up the numbers” (Samuel 2015), 
a typical trick in “governance by numbers” (Supiot 2015). 
The St. Matthew effect was also at work here, that is to say, “the tendency 
of social investment policies to favour less disadvantaged groups within a 
given target population” (Vesan 2014). Indeed, the redefinition of the classes of 
disadvantage saw all the available resources go to those who had already regis-
tered on the scheme, making them “count” more than the more fragile NEETs. 
In this respect, the Italian YG appears to follow the narrowest approach to 
activation, subscribing to the idea the NEETs are personally responsible for the 
                                                             
12  The Jobs Act bonus was for a maximum of €8,060/year for three years, while the maximum 
value of the YG employment bonus was set at €6,000.  
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situation they find themselves in: it emphasizes both a candidates’ willingness 
to self-activate and their readiness to access the jobs market via generic work 
experience, with a view to attaining an oxymoronic “solid adaptability” to the 
unstable needs of the labour market. But with two effects: on the one hand, the 
weeding out of the more disadvantaged NEETs; and on the other, risking per-
petuating their disadvantage because, as several authors have pointed out 
(Mozzana and Bifulco 2016; Otto 2015), policies that seek to foster youth 
employment from a workfare perspective do not create healthy and stable la-
bour conditions (Peck 2001).  
7.  Conclusions  
As stated at the outset, the deployment of quantification tools to regulate access 
to public welfare schemes is a very recent component of active labour market 
policies in Italy, even though the use of data, indicators, and numbers is becom-
ing pervasive in the policy-making process and they are used to programme, 
monitor, assess, and develop tools that on the one hand facilitate the “effective 
and efficient” allocation of resources and on the other can control this process.  
With regard to the tools that govern access to YG services in Italy, the DI 
makes the status of a young person immediately recognisable and identifiable, 
while also satisfying the NPM requirement for an efficient distribution of re-
sources. However, the DI offers too little information about the young people 
on the scheme and forces them into standardised categories that represent more 
of a limitation than a true resource, both for the participants themselves and for 
the attainment of the YG plan objectives. The profiling system used by the 
Italian YG scheme appears to serialize youths, making them into clearly identi-
fiable types. This means that they are incidences of a kind and so are offered 
standardized treatment, rather than tailored interventions in wide open spaces 
for listening to peoples’ concerns about their lives, desires, and aspirations 
(Appadurai 2004). 
In addition, the DI is not a neutral technology that helps institutions to gov-
ern the complexity of the real. Instead, its ambiguity and the continuous shifts 
in its goals and meanings have contributed to pushing the policy in the opposite 
direction to that originally desired. The collapse of the normative dimension of 
law into the cognitive one of knowledge, that is to say, the shifting around of 
meanings and purposes associated with the use of a statistic tool gives rise to an 
ambiguous instrument; invented to describe, statistics are here conceptualized 
and used as a means of regulating and distributing resources and people. 
Hence, the profiling instrument turns out to be a knowledge technology that 
controls and disciplines both people and the intervention (Rottenburg and Mer-
ry 2015) and the tool itself contributes to this ambiguity. Quantification tends 
to conceal and camouflage ambiguity while fuelling the collapse of normative 
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and cognitive dimensions (de Leonardis 2009). The ambiguous nature of the 
profiling system may be recognised and addressed by maintaining open public 
debate about such instruments and their workings, with a view to changing, 
redefining, and adapting them to the different conditions in which they will be 
implemented, and creating a reflective instrument that may be modified as 
necessary (Donolo 1997; de Leonardis 2009). Indeed, following the pilot 
phase, some changes were made to the DI, but the underlying logic was the 
NPM one: de facto letting down the more severely disadvantaged NEETs while 
the political dimension of this choice through technical adjustments. 
Furthermore, the use of instruments based on quantifying knowledge comes 
from, and at the same time reproduces, the tendency to take sources and results 
expressed in numbers for granted. Numbers offer clarity, immediacy, objectivi-
ty, and neutrality (Porter 1995; Power 1997) because, with time, quantification 
tends to hide the “theoretical and normative assumption inscribed in [numbers], 
and the complexities, messiness and contingencies that went into their making” 
(Rottenburg and Merry 2015), as well as the fact that they are the result of 
conventions, agreements, and conflicts (Salais 2010; see also Diaz-Bone 2019 
and Thévenot 2019, both in this issue). But when the political dimension of a 
political instrument, such as the profiling system analysed here, definitively 
disappears, and the DI becomes a rigid and cold tool (a black box, in the terms 
of Bruno Latour, 1987), it will likely be (even more) unsuitable for regulating 
young people's access to YG services. The transition from “government by 
rules” to “governance by numbers” (Supiot 2015) entails risks, including that 
of obscuring political processes and decision making, which, by their very 
nature, should remain public and questionable. Transposing choices that are 
deeply political into numbers (sometimes poorly, as in the case analysed) 
means depoliticizing the public action via social policies (Bifulco 2016): num-
bers provide a language for generalizing the economic metric at the core of the 
neoliberal spirit, “dissimulat[-ing] the normative work they do”, and contrib-
uting to vanquishing “the already anaemic ‘homo politicus’ currently being 
replaced by the ‘homo oeconomicus’” (Brown 2015, 135). The persistent 
growth of tools that “do politics without saying it”, denying the political core of 
choices (Burnham 2000) is thus a phenomenon that calls for more in-depth 
investigation, especially with regard to how the advancement of “governing by 
numbers” is playing out within the relationship between power and knowledge; 
an open-ended pathway of inquiry, which is worthy of pursuit. 
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